Nearly 40 years after the armed forces of the United States withdrew from the war in Vietnam, Americans are still trying to determine what went wrong and why.
Among the most recent assessments is a book titled “Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam,” by Lewis Sorley, who served in Vietnam as an Army officer and later became a military historian.
The book’s title is apt. The author lays much of the blame for the U.S. defeat at the feet on the late Gen. William C. Westmoreland, who commanded U.S. forces in Vietnam in 1964-1968. In doing so, the author evidently sought to destroy the claim that Americans fighting in Vietnam did so “with their hands tied” by the politicians at home.
According to Sorley, Westmoreland ignored guidance from the White House, Defense Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Chief of Staff, and Pacific Commander in Hawaii. Equally, he ignored subordinates in Vietnam who sought to tell their commander what they had learned from experience in the jungles and mountains of Vietnam.
Sorley quotes Westmoreland: “The President never tried to tell me how to run the war. The tactics and battlefield strategy of running the war were mine.” The general added: “I, in effect, had a carte blanche in the devising and pursuing tactics and battlefield strategy of the war.”
For a time after 1973, when the U.S. pulled out of Vietnam after fighting there for almost 20 years, war-weary Americans didn’t want to think about Vietnam nor write about it nor read about it. A common refrain: “We just wanted it to go away.”
Then, little by little, soldiers, diplomats, journalists, and scholars started to delve into critical questions about the war. Westmoreland himself published a memoir, “A Soldier Reports,” in which he sought in 1976 to put the best face on his service in Vietnam. The reaction to the book, Sorley writes, was “decidedly mixed.”
Among the earliest of the searching appraisals was “On Strategy: a Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War,” written by an Army colonel, Harry Summers. He found that the U.S. had violated many of the principles of war set down in the 19th century by the Prussian theorist, Carl von Clausewitz.
Gen. Bruce Palmer published a thoughtful account in “The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam” in 1984. H.R. McMaster, then an Army colonel, now a brigadier general, put out a well-received study in 1997: “Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joints Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam.”
Several of the key political figures wrote of their experiences with the Vietnam issue. Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense 1961-1968, came out with a 1995 apologia “In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam.”
Henry Kissinger, who, as national security assistant to President Nixon, negotiated the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and was later secretary of state, published a 2003 defense of his role under the title “Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War.”
An influential assessment of the press in Vietnam was Peter Braestrup’s “Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington.” Braestrup, a Washington Post correspondent in Vietnam, asserted in 1977 that the press had been overwhelmed by the Communist onslaught.
Although Sorley assigns to Westmoreland much of the responsibility for the failure in Vietnam, he does not let the political leaders escape. “What is baffling,” he writes, “is that these senior civilian officials nevertheless allowed Westmoreland to doggedly pursue his flawed approach for year after bloody year.”
“Thus,” the author concludes, “almost by default Westmoreland was left to go his own way.” What the general did, he says, “was squander four years of his troops’ bravery and support by the public, the Congress, and even most of the news media for the war in Vietnam.”
With a nod to what was known in the Vietnam era as the credibility gap between government pronouncements and reality, Sorley says that “at a postwar symposium where reporting from the combat zone was being discussed, Westmoreland asserted: ‘I could care less. My job is on the battlefield.’”
In the dusk of his life, Westmoreland was seen by many as a tragic character for having lost the war, lost a run for governor of South Carolina, and lost a disastrous libel suit against CBS news. Sorley summed up: “It was a sad ending for a man who for most of his life and career had led a charmed existence.”
