Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel told a Congressional committee last week that he had directed the civilian and military leaders of the Pentagon to undertake a full-scale “Strategic Choices and Management Review” of the nation’s defense enterprise.

Military wags, reflecting the addiction to acronyms that plagues all of the armed forces, quickly labeled the directive a SCAM aimed at sluicing money away from the services without fixing anything.

Hagel, however, insisted that everything should be considered, from missions to planning to pay to buying weapons to Pentagon organization. He asserted the review would “require not just tweaking or chipping away at existing structures and practices but, if necessary, fashioning entirely new ones that better reflect 21st century realities.”

Okay Mr. Secretary, here’s a proposal: Begin to cut costs right in your building by puncturing the bloated Pentagon bureaucracy:

  • Dismantle the feudal Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in favor of a unified Department of Defense.
  • Abolish the bickering Joint Chiefs of Staff in favor of a streamlined Military Staff with operational control over the forces.

The Secretary of Defense today is not the master of his own house but only the most prominent baron sharing power with three other barons known, respectively, as the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The main role of those barons is to fight for money from Congress for their fiefs while the Secretary of Defense referees.

This squabbling apparatus carries down through the ranks. In personnel, the Pentagon has a civilian assistant secretary of defense for personnel and assistant secretaries in the military departments. Under them are five three-star personnel officers, one each for the Joint Chiefs and the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

Mr. Secretary, the Pentagon doesn’t need nine senior officials and officers to make personnel policy. One civilian and a three-star officer in each service would do. Moreover, this inefficient arrangement in personnel is duplicated throughout the Pentagon, particularly in the development and procurement of arms and equipment.

Scrubbing this legion of political appointees with cumbersome titles and military officers with shoulders laden with stars would save a bundle in salaries and perks. More important, streamlining their staffs would save time, energy, and the taxpayer’s money by simplifying procedures.

Instead of the contentious military departments, four politically-appointed under secretaries reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense would maintain the constitutionally-prescribed civilian control over the armed forces.

One under secretary would have oversight of the combat forces; another over strategy, policy, and the intelligence agencies; a third the development and purchase of arms and equipment; and a fourth the vast logistics apparatus of the armed forces.

In particular, the Undersecretary for Combat Forces would supervise the four uniformed chiefs of staff of the armed services. With the abolition of the military departments, there should be less temptation to engage in the excessive and costly interservice rivalry of today. (But only a dreamer would think that would disappear entirely!)

Mr. Secretary, about 30 years ago, the Chief of Staff of the Army then, General Edward Meyer, nicknamed “Shy” the way a tall man might be called “Shorty,” said: “If we were trying to convince an enemy that we were able to go to war with a system that works like this, he would laugh.”

Central to General Meyer’s critique was the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the committee formed in 1947 when the Department of Defense was founded in an effort to unify the armed forces. With the JCS supposedly leading the armed forces, the mixed historical record bears out Shy Meyer’s judgment.

Over the last six decades, the U.S. has fought to a draw in Korea, been defeated in Vietnam, pulled off minor operations in Grenada and Panama, fought well in Desert Storm near the Persian Gulf, botched an invasion of Iraq, and has been bogged down for ten years in Afghanistan.

To lead a more effective armed force, the JCS should be replaced with a Chief of Military Staff who would be the commanding officer of the forces and exercise operational control over them. The chief would take orders from the President and the Secretary of Defense and, in turn, direct the combatant commanders in the field.

The Chief of Military Staff, who would serve for no more than four years to preclude an incumbent from forging a clique, would come in rotation from one of the four services as would the officers serving on the centralized military staff. To enhance their work, serving on this general staff would be considered a plum assignment.

Richard Halloran, who writes the weekly column called “The Rising East,” contributes articles on Asia and US relations with Asia to publications in America and Asia. His career can be divided into thirds: One third studying and reporting on Asia, another third writing about national security, and...