Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and General Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, flew to Baghdad last week to witness the last of American combat forces in Iraq furl their colors and prepare to leave after nearly ten years of battle.
“With the departure of the remaining U.S. forces within these last few days to the end of the year,” Panetta said in an address to troops and dignitaries, “we salute the fact that Iraq is now fully responsible for directing its own path to future security and future prosperity.”
In the long term, the withdrawal of all but a handful of U.S. troops may well mark the end of an era that began 70 years ago when the U.S. entered World War II. Since then, the prevailing American strategy has been a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military intervention almost anywhere in the world.
President John Kennedy set the interventionist rallying cry in his 1961 inaugural address: ”Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”
Today, with polls showing that 75 percent of Americans approve of the withdrawal from Iraq, a war-weary, politically dispirited, and economically depressed people seem ready to have their armed forces and diplomats pull back from troubles elsewhere. Proposals for retrenchment have become persistent.
Retrenchment, an awkward word, would set the proper course in national security for the foreseeable future, in the view of some strategic thinkers. It would include reducing military commitments, deployments, and spending, getting the government’s budget deficit under control, and demanding that political leaders of all parties quit bickering.
An imperative: Retrenchment would require U.S. allies to assume more of the burden for the common defense. Every major U.S. ally or friend now spends less than three percent of its gross national product on defense, compared with 4.5 percent by American taxpayers. Some, notably Japan, spend only one percent.
President Richard Nixon tried to set conditions for allies in his 1969 Guam Doctrine. The U.S. would keep its treaty commitments and provide a nuclear shield but would insist that “the nation directly threatened assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.” That condition, however, has never been fulfilled.
Retrenchment does not mean returning to isolation behind the Atlantic and Pacific moats even though that tradition dates back to the early days of the nation. In his inaugural address in 1801, President Thomas Jefferson called for “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.”
Among the earliest of the current advocates of retrenchment has been Michael Mandelbaum, of Johns Hopkins University, who has written that America’s coming retrenchment will be a consequence of government budget cuts.
Similarly, Joseph Parent and Paul MacDonald, political scientists as the University of Miami and Williams College respectively, have asserted: “The United States can no longer afford a world-spanning foreign policy.”
“Retrenchment — cutting military spending, redefining foreign priorities, and shifting more of the defense burden to allies — is the only sensible course,” they contend. “History shows that pausing to recharge national batteries can renew a dominant power’s international legitimacy.”
Still another scholar specializing in national security, Charles Kupchan of Georgetown University and onetime member of the National Security Council staff, has set four principles for national power. He says the U.S. “must rebalance means and ends by pursuing a judicious retrenchment.”
“The nation,” he has written, “needs to bring its strategic commitments back into line with its interests, resources, and public will.” The other three principles are recovering political and economic solvency at home, working with emerging powers to fashion an inclusive global order, and revitalizing the Atlantic community of democracies.
President Obama appears not to have come this far in his thinking but Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton indicated in her now famous Foreign Policy article that they are headed in this direction: “As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point.”
“Over the last 10 years,” she wrote, “we have allocated immense resources to those two theaters. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values.”
President Obama and Secretary Clinton have indicated that retrenchment will apply only marginally to Asia and the Pacific. A task for American statecraft over the next decade, she wrote, “will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment — diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise — in the Asia-Pacific region.”
