A conflict between Japan and South Korea has gotten so intense, with no resolution in sight, that it may be time for the U.S. to step in to insist that its two allies put the past behind them and tend to the more urgent issues of today.

The immediate question is a dispute about sovereignty over rocks in the sea between the two nations called Dokdo by Koreans, Takeshima by Japanese, and Liancourt Rocks by the U.S. and most of the rest of the world.

But that squabble is only the latest in a complicated history that goes back in the last century to Japan’s occupation of Korea from 1905 to 1945. Before that was a political, cultural, economic, and military rivalry that began in the 6th Century.

Today, this antipathy seems so deep-rooted that no resolution is possible. Victor Cha, a Korean-American scholar who is a leading authority on this issue, wrote recently: “Historical animosity between Korea and Japan will never die. Historical issues are inherently irresolvable.”

Cha, of Georgetown University in Washington D.C., pointed to the “deep reservoir of distrust” on both sides. Temporary solutions have been sought, he said, “but the anger and resentment never go away.”

Cha, who served on the national security staff in the White House in 2004-07, thus concluded: “We have to accept the reality that historical enmity constitutes the baseline of Seoul-Tokyo relations.”

This baseline, in turn, is the weakest link in the U.S. security posture in Asia, a flaw that one day could be fatal if confrontations with North Korea or China erupt into hostilities.

In pursuit of its national interests, the U.S. would appear to have four choices: 1) To keep hands off because a settlement is impossible; 2) To muddle through, urging Korean and Japanese leaders to get along; 3) To mediate a settlement; or 4) To require Japanese and Korean leaders to find a solution as the price of a continued alliance with the U.S.

Options 1 and 2 are unacceptable because too much is at stake. Option 3 would be dangerous because the U.S. would almost certainly be seen as favoring one side or the other and the mediation would most likely fail.

To pursue Option 4, the U.S. should be unquestionably even-handed and be seen by all as even-handed. To compel Korean and Japanese leaders, the U.S. could:

  • Caution them that the U.S. Congress and public have limited patience with those who bicker over rocks in the water and thus could seriously damage Japanese and Korean interests in America;
  • Take the issue to the UN Security Council. The council could do little to force a resolution but Japan and Korea would be embarrassed internationally. The U.S. would also veto Japan or Korea from taking a rotating seat on the council.
  • Quietly inform Korean and Japanese leaders that any hint of a military show of force or other confrontation would cause their security treaties with the U.S. to lapse. (The treaties are written to give the U.S. an easy out.)
  • Disclose that U.S. forces in both nations would no longer conduct joint training with their forces and the question of whether American forces would be available for the defense of South Korea or Japan would be left open.

Complicating any U.S. effort to lean on the Japanese and Koreans would be Americans who have become “Japan hands” or “Korea hands” through long contacts with Koreans or Japanese. Some tend to favor one side or another.

Jeffrey Hornung, a scholar at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies funded by the Defense Department in Honolulu, has written that Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s recent visit to Dokdo/Takeshima “was irresponsible and the consequences will be long lasting.”

Hornung, a Japan specialist, asserted that ”the Japanese government and society have made concerted efforts to understand, reconcile, and apologize for Japan’s wartime aggression.”

Daniel Sneider, of a research center at Stanford University in California and a longtime student of Korea, has contended: “Japanese history textbooks do not provide students with a detailed accounting of Japanese colonial rule, particularly in Korea.”

He maintains Japan has “avoided or downplayed some of the more controversial aspects of the wartime period, such as the coercive recruitment of women for sexual services by the Japanese Imperial Army.”

By contrast, Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum think tank in Honolulu, has exclaimed: “Enough is enough! Obviously, the political leadership in Tokyo and Seoul never learned about the First Rule of Holes: when you find yourself in one, stop digging.”

“Each side seems to be going out of its way to make a bad situation worse,” Cossa said.

He contended that “significant damage has already been done” and “it’s getting worse by the day.”

Richard Halloran, who writes the weekly column called “The Rising East,” contributes articles on Asia and US relations with Asia to publications in America and Asia. His career can be divided into thirds: One third studying and reporting on Asia, another third writing about national security, and...