For six decades, American policy toward China has been shaped by a scheme called “strategic ambiguity.” The summit meeting between President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping of China 10 days ago suggests that “strategic ambiguity” should be retired in favor of “strategic clarity, tactical ambiguity.”

After the Communists led by Mao Zedong came to power in Beijing in October 1949, Truman and his administration struggled with a dilemma. They did not want the U.S. to get into a war with the new Chinese regime. Nor did they wish to see Taiwan, the island to which the Nationalist Chinese had fled, fall under mainland control.

Thus in January, 1950, Truman issued a statement saying: “The United States government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.” But the president and his advisors would not say what the U.S. would do to enforce their policy.

Then in June, 1950, that ambiguous policy was hardened when North Korea attacked South Korea to begin the Korean War. Truman, fearing Beijing would launch a parallel attack on Taiwan, ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific to prevent that assault and to block any Nationalist offensive against the mainland.

In succeeding decades, “strategic ambiguity” was the watchword during the war in Vietnam, the shift in diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, and the emergence of China as a regional economic, political, and military power. The intent was to keep the Chinese guessing about what the U.S. would do.

Over those years, however, Chinese leaders have become more firm as they have identified what they call their “core interests” and at time have been more aggressive, even belligerent.

In the California summit, contrast the tone emitted by President Xi as explained by Yang Jiechi, a senior party official and former foreign minister, and Tom Donilon, a senior staffer for the National Security Council. They briefed the press separately after the summit meeting in an estate on the edge of the desert.

Yang was clear-cut in stating the Chinese positions. That included Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan and large portions of the South China Sea and an adamant denial that China was responsible for hacking into U.S. cyber transmissions.

Yang appeared to assert that Xi had set the course of the conversation by proposing a four point program for improving Sino-American relations. That included elevating the level of dialogue between Chinese and Americans and having the U.S. relax restrictions on hi-tech exports to China.

In addition, he said Xi had called for Sino-American coordination on hotspots such as the Korean Peninsula and Afghanistan and on peacekeeping and cyber security. Lastly, the Chinese proposed fostering new Sino-American military relations. Yang said Obama responded positively to the proposal.

Donilon, however, indicated that Obama did not respond to those proposals. Instead, Donilon dwelled on the eight hours of conversation and the atmospherics of the meeting.

Among the few substantive points: Donilon said Obama had warned Xi that continued Chinese hacking into U.S. cyber systems would have adverse consequences. But those consequences were not identified specifically.

In sum, Obama’s stance on China came off as soft, vague, and perhaps even indecisive — much like the policies of several previous administrations whether Democratic or Republican. That lack of clear-cut U.S. objectives and interests has made the chances of a strategic miscalculation more likely.

A few instances of an American policy of “strategic clarity” would look like this:

On Taiwan, the U.S. insists that any change in the status quo be peaceable and in accord with the wishes of the people of Taiwan freely expressed.

On the South China Sea and every other international body of water, the warships of all nations will have freedom of navigation in accord with international maritime law.

On intellectual property rights, the U.S. recognizes that there are cultural differences in what constitutes IPR and is willing to negotiate agreements on such rights.

Actually, in substance, such suggested policies are not far from stands that the U.S. has taken, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, in recent years. But the nuance would be more clearly stated and the posture given greater strength.

In the execution of those and other policies, however, the U.S. would reserve the right to decide the means, timing, and place in which Americans would seek to protect their national core interests. That would be the essence of “tactical ambiguity.”

Richard Halloran, who writes the weekly column called “The Rising East,” contributes articles on Asia and US relations with Asia to publications in America and Asia. His career can be divided into thirds: One third studying and reporting on Asia, another third writing about national security, and...